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LITERARY-RIGHTS FEE AGREEMENTS IN
CALIFORNIA: LETTING THE RABBIT





The criminal escapades of serial killers often make appealing stories
for the curious public. Consequently, selling movies or books about such
escapades and related criminal trials has created a profitable way for de-
fense attorneys in California to negotiate fee agreements with their
clients. I
A situation involving a literary-rights fee agreement normally arises
when an indigent defendent selects a private criminal defense attorney
and assigns to the attorney exclusive publication rights to the defendant's
life story in lieu of attorneys' fees.' A potential conflict of interest arises,
however, betweeen the attorney's interest in securing a handsome fee and
the defendant's interest in a vigorous defense.'
In Maxwell v. Superior Court,4 the California Supreme Court rebuf-
fed a claim by a defendant that a literary-rights fee agreement violated
his sixth amendment' right to counsel.6 The court reasoned that by en-
tering into a literary-rights fee agreement, the defendant waived his right
* J.D., McGeorge School of Law. The author is currently a Deputy District Attorney at
the Riverside County District Attorney's Office. Financial support for this Article was pro-
vided through a grant from the John Stauffer Charitable Trust, McGeorge School of Law.
1. See People v. Bonin, 47 Cal. 3d 808, 836, 765 P.2d 460, 475, 254 Cal. Rptr. 298, 314
(1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1506 (1990).
2. Id. at 836, 765 P.2d at 475, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 313-14; Maxwell v. Superior Court, 30
Cal. 3d 606, 610, 639 P.2d 248, 249-50, 254 Cal. Rptr. 177, 178-79 (1982).
3. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.8 comment 3 (1989) [herein-
after MODEL RULES]. Defendants enjoy a constitutional right to counsel free from conflicts of
interest. Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 70 (1942) (interpreting U.S. CONST. amend.
VI). However, this right may be waived. Bonin, 47 Cal. 3d at 837, 765 P.2d at 476, 254 Cal.
Rptr. at 314.
4. 30 Cal. 3d 606, 639 P.2d 248, 254 Cal. Rptr. 177 (1982).
5. U.S. CONsT. amend. VI.
6. Maxwell, 30 Cal. 3d at 621, 639 P.2d at 257, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 186.
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to conflict-free counsel.7 The court, in reiterating its view from previous
cases, held that such waivers are binding so long as they are made know-
ingly and intelligently.'
In California, a defendant appealing a conviction on the grounds
that no waiver was sought, or that an invalid one was obtained, must
overcome two hurdles.9 First, the defendant must prove that the trial
court knew, or should have known, of a potential conflict of interest be-
tween the defendant and his or her attorney, and the court still did not
protect the defendant by either eliciting a valid waiver or by offering the
defendant substitute counsel.10 Second, the defendant must prove that
an actual conflict of interest existed and that conflict adversely affected
the defense counsel's performance." If these two hurdles are overcome,
the sixth amendment right to effective assistance of counsel has been vio-
lated, and the defendant is entitled to reversal of his or her conviction
and a new trial.12
Unfortunately, this test for determining whether a defendant's sixth
amendment rights have been violated puts the defendant in a very vul-
nerable position. To begin with, it is extremely difficult to determine
whether a defendant who has entered into a literary-rights fee agreement
truly waived his or her right to conflict-free counsel in an intelligent
manner.13 Likewise, the fact that the trial court's duty to protect the
defendant arises only when the court knew or should have known of a
potential conflict saddles the defendant with the additional burden of
making the conflict apparent to the court. 4 If neither the defendant nor
the defense attorney notifies the trial court of a literary-rights fee agree-
ment, it is likely that the trial court's duty to protect the defendant would
never arise, and the defendant could lose this basis for appealing a poten-
tial conviction."i To compound this problem, an attorney may not feel
compelled to notify the court of the agreement because such agreements
appear to be permitted by the California Rules of Professional Conduct.16
7. Id at 621-22ge; qr /, 639 P.2d at 257, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 187.
8. Bonin, 47 Cal. 3d at 837, 765 P.2d at 476, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 314; Maxwell, 30 Cal. 3d
at 619, 639 P.2d at 256, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 185; see Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748
(1969).
9. Bonin, 47 Cal. 3d at 837-38, 765 P.2d at 476, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 314-15.
10. Id at 836-37, 765 P.2d at 475-76, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 314.
11. Id at 837-38, 765 P.2d at 476, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 315.
12. Id
13. See infra notes 134-49 and accompanying text.
14. Bonin, 47 Cal. 3d at 836-37, 765 P.2d at 476, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 314.
15. See id at 839 & n.1, 765 P.2d at 477-78 & n.1, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 316 & n.1.
16. CAL. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 5-210 (1989) [hereinafter CAL.
RULES].
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In addition, before a court will reverse a conviction and grant a new
trial, a defendant must show that an actual conflict existed which ad-
versely affected counsel's performance.' 7 This showing does not accu-
rately reflect either the conflict or the prejudice resulting when
defendants and their lawyers enter into literary-rights fee agreements.'"
Finally, the present law in California concerning waiver of the right to
conflict-free counsel and the standard of reversible error in literary-rights
fee agreement cases ignores the public interest in seeing just convictions
resulting from effective advocacy. 9
This Article sets forth the current state of the law regarding literary-
rights fee agreements. It then examines policy concerns surrounding a
defendant's waiver of conflict-free counsel. The author next discusses the
procedure for evaluating a defendant's claim that a literary-rights fee
agreement violated his or her right to effective assistance of counsel. The
author then suggests that literary-rights fee agreements violate the de-
fendant's sixth amendment right to effective assistance of counsel, as well
as the public's interest in the fair and efficient administration of justice."0
Finally, the author asserts that defendants claiming ineffective assistance
of counsel based on a literary-rights fee agreements should benefit from a
presumption of prejudice standard, rather than the more difficult to
prove standard generally applied to conflicts of interest claims. Accord-
ingly, the author proposes several legislative and judicial remedies to pro-
tect defendants and the public from problems arising out of literary-
rights fee agreements. 2 '
II. THE PRESENT STATE OF THE LAW REGARDING LITERARY-
RIGHTS FEE AGREEMENTS AND THE RIGHT TO EFFECTIVE
COUNSEL IN CALIFORNIA
This section discusses the defendant's sixth amendment right to con-
flict-free counsel as defined in Wood v. Georgia22 and applied in a subse-
quent California literary-rights fee agreement case. Although Wood and
17. Bonin, 47 Cal. 3d at 837-38, 765 P.2d at 470, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 314-15.
18. See infra notes 218-20 and accompanying text for a discussion of the difficulty in
proving prejudice and the inability of a trial record to accurately indicate a conflict's impact on
counsel's performance.
19. See infra notes 85-90 and accompanying text.
20. Other interests may be balanced with the defendant's right to waive conflict-free coun-
sel. See Maxwell, 30 Cal. 3d at 634, 639 P.2d at 265, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 194 (Richardson, J.,
dissenting) ("Although a defendant may waive rights which exist for his own benefit, he may
not waive rights which belong also to the public generally."). For a discussion of cases citing
this proposition, see Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 158 n.2 (1987).
21. See infra note 229-33 and accompanying text.
22. 450 U.S. 261 (1981).
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the subsequent California cases recognize a defendant's right to conflict-
free counsel, such cases do not proscribe literary-rights fee agreements.
This section also discusses California's ethical rules regarding literary-
rights fee agreements, which similarly do not protect defendants from
conflicts arising from such agreements. Finally, this section discusses
California's criminal antiprofit statute. Although this statute restricts
profits that defendants can earn from literary works involving their
crimes, it does not specifically address literary-rights fee agreements.
A. The Federal Constitution: Wood v. Georgia
The sixth amendment to the United States Constitution23 guarantees
a criminal defendant the right to effective counsel, 24 and, to a certain
extent, counsel of choice.25 The United States Supreme Court held in
Wood v. Georgia26 that the right to "effective" assistance of counsel in-
cludes "a correlative right to representation that is free from conflicts of
interest."27 This right to effective assistance of counsel free from con-
fficts of interest raises two distinct issues. The first is how to determine
whether a violation of that right has occurred; the second, assuming
there has been such a violation, is how to determine whether the defend-
ant is entitled to reversal of a trial court's decision. 28
The Wood Court outlined an approach that all trial courts must use
to determine potential conflicts at the pretrial stage.29 Initially, when
"the possibility of a conflict of interest is sufficiently apparent," the trial
court must inquire into the matter." If the court's initial inquiry reveals
that an actual conflict existed and that there was no valid waiver of the
right to conflict-free counsel, a new trial may be ordered. 1 On the other
hand, a trial court's failure to inquire into the potential existence of a
conflict when it had a duty to do so requires that the case be remanded
back to the trial court for a determination of whether an actual conflict
23. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
24. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984). The sixth amendment right to
counsel has been applied to the states through the due process clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment. Gideon v. Wainright, 372 U.S. 335, 340 (1963); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
25. People v. Robinson, 42 Cal. 2d 741, 746, 269 P.2d 6, 9 (1954).
26. 450 U.S. 261 (1981).
27. Id at 271. In Wood, the defendants were convicted of distributing obscene materials
and sentenced to probation on the condition that they make regular payments toward the fines.
Id at 262. The defendants failed to make these payments, and their probations were revoked.
Id
28. See id at 273-74.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 272.
31. Id. at 273-74.
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existed.32
B. California's Application of Wood v. Georgia
In 1989, the California Supreme Court, in People v. Bonin,33 ad-
dressed the issue of what constitutes sufficient inquiry by a trial court
into potential conflicts of interest between an attorney and a criminal
defendant.3 4 In Bonin, the defendant, otherwise known as the "Freeway
Killer, 31 5 was charged with fourteen murders. 6 Before the trial began,
Bonin moved to have his court-appointed counsel, Earl L. Hansen, sub-
stituted with William T. Charvet, a private attorney.37 Bonin stated that
he felt he could not discuss certain matters with Hansen because of "per-
sonal vibes."
38
The prosecution opposed the defendant's request on four separate
grounds.3 9 One of these grounds was the prosecution's fear that any re-
tainer agreement between Bonin and Charvet might have involved book
rights, thereby creating a conflict of interest.' ° The court responded by
asking Charvet about the existence of any literary-rights fee arrange-
ment.41 Charvet replied that the prosecution had no right to probe into
any fee arrangements between Charvet and his clients.42 Charvet further
expressed his view that the United States Supreme Court would not de-
clare a literary-rights fee agreement unlawful per se.4 3 The trial court
inquired no further.'
On appeal, Bonin claimed that his representation by Charvet was
tainted by a conflict of interest.45 The California Supreme Court held
that given the fact that no actual evidence of a literary-rights fee agree-
ment was presented to the trial court, the court's duty to inquire into the
possibility of a conflict had not been triggered.46 The California Supreme
32. Id at 273.
33. 47 Cal. 3d 808, 765 P.2d 460, 254 Cal. Rptr. 298 (1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1506
(1990).
34. Id at 838-43, 765 P.2d at 476-80, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 315-19.
35. Id at 820, 765 P.2d at 465, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 304.
36. Id at 819, 765 P.2d at 465, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 303.
37. Id at 825, 765 P.2d at 469, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 307.
38. Id at 826, 765 P.2d at 469, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 308.
39. Id at 825, 765 P.2d at 469, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 307.
40. Id.
41. Id at 828, 765 P.2d at 470-71, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 309.
42. Id
43. Id., 765 P.2d at 471, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 309.
44. Id. at 829, 765 P.2d at 471, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 309.
45. Id. at 824-25, 765 P.2d at 468, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 307.
46. Id at 838, 765 P.2d at 476-77, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 315. The court, however, found that
the trial court failed to discharge its duty of inquiry under Wood regarding the possibility of a
January 1991]
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Court held:
The court cannot be deemed to have known, or have had rea-
son to know, of the possibility of a conflict in this regard. In
our view, a court can be held to have knowledge or notice of
the possibility of a conflict only when, as in Wood itself, it is
provided with evidence of the existence of a conflict situation-
a circumstance not present here. 7
Therefore, despite the facts that (1) Bonin was indigent at the time the
court appointed Hansen, and apparently remained so; (2) the case had an
extraordinarily high profile; and (3) Charvet gave a non-responsive reply
when asked about the existence of a literary-rights fee agreement, the
court found the evidence was insufficient to trigger the duty of inquiry.4"
As Justice Broussard pointed out in a separate opinion, however, "It
is difficult to understand what 'evidence' the majority would require."49
Justice Broussard observed that the duty of inquiry arises when the court
knows or has reason to know that a potential conflict exists.5 0 Further-
more, he urged that Wood v. Georgia 11 established a duty to inquire even
when there is simply a "suggestion" of conflict.52 The trial court knew
that the defendant was indigent from the fact that he qualified for a
court-appointed attorney. 3 Given this knowledge, the trial court should
have questioned how Bonin, an indigent, could afford a private defense
counsel.5" Thus, Justice Broussard found that the Bonin trial court failed
to fulfill its Wood duty of inquiry.
C. California Ethical Rules
Although Disciplinary Rule (DR) 5-104(B) of the American Bar
Association (ABA) Model Code of Professional Responsibility (the Model
conflict of interest arising out of a former attorney-client relationship between Charvet's law
firm and a key prosecution witness. Id. at 838, 765 P.2d at 477, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 315. Ulti-
mately, the California Supreme Court found that Bonin failed to establish any adverse effect on
Charvet's performance resulting from the alleged conflict. Id. at 843, 765 P.2d at 480, 254
Cal. Rptr. at 318. Accordingly, the Wood error did not warrant reversal. Id.
47. Id. at 838, 765 P.2d at 476-77, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 315 (construing Wood v. Georgia, 450
U.S. 261 (1981)).
48. Id. at 838, 765 P.2d at 477, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 315.
49. d at 859, 765 P.2d at 491, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 329 (Broussard, J., concurring and
dissenting).
50. Id. (Broussard, J., concurring and dissenting).
51. 450 U.S. 261 (1981).
52. Bonin, 47 Cal. 3d at 859, 765 P.2d at 491, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 329 (Broussard, J., concur-
ring and dissenting) (citing Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 261, 272-73 (1981)).
53. See id. at 825, 765 P.2d at 468, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 307.
54. See id. at 860-61, 765 P.2d at 492, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 330 (Broussard, J., concurring and
dissenting).
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Code) and Rule 1.8 of the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct
(the Model Rules) expressly prohibit literary-rights fee agreements,5" the
California Rules of Professional Conduct do not.56 DR 5-104(B) of the
Model Code prohibits any literary-rights fee agreement prior to the com-
plete termination of the subject litigation.57 This rule provides:
Prior to conclusion of all aspects of the matter giving rise to his
employment, a lawyer shall not enter into any arrangement or
understanding with a client or a prospective client by which he
acquires an interest in publication rights with respect to the
subject matter of his employment or proposed employment.
5 8
Similar language, prohibiting or condemning such transactions, is also
found in both Rule 1.8 of the Model Rules,5 9 as well as in the ethical
considerations of the Model Code." These provisions presume a conflict
of interest between the defense attorney and the client whenever they
enter into a literary-rights fee arrangement, because "[m]easures suitable
in the representation of the client may detract from the publication value
of an account of the representation."'" Unfortunately, California has not
followed the ABA's approach.
Rule 3-300 of the California Rules of Professional Conduct provides:
A member shall not enter into a business transaction with
a client; or knowingly acquire an ownership, possessory, secur-
ity, or other pecuniary interest adverse to a client, unless each
of the following requirements has been satisfied:
(A) The transaction or acquisition and its terms are fair
and reasonable to the client and are fully disclosed and trans-
55. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-104(B) (1981) [hereinafter
MODEL CODE]; MODEL RULES, supra note 3, Rule 1.8.
56. See CAL. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1989).
57. MODEL CODE, supra note 55, DR 5-104(B).
58. Id.
59. MODEL RULES, supra note 3, Rule 1.8(d). Rule 1.8(d) provides: "Prior to the conclu-
sion of representation of a client, a lawyer shall not make or negotiate an agreement giving the
lawyer literary or media rights to a portrayal or account based in substantial part on informa-
tion relating to the representation." Id.
60. MODEL CODE, supra note 55, EC 5-4. Ethical Consideration (EC) 5-4 provides:
If, in the course of his representation of a client, a lawyer is permitted to receive from
his client a beneficial ownership in publication rights relating to the subject matter of
the employment, he may be tempted to subordinate the interests of his client to his
own anticipated pecuniary gain.... To prevent these potentially differing interests,
such arrangements should be scrupulously avoided prior to the termination of all
aspects of the matter giving rise to the employment ....
MODEL CODE, supra note 55, EC 5-4.
61. MODEL RULES, supra note 3, Rule 1.8 comment 3.
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mitted in writing to the client in a manner which should rea-
sonably have been understood by the client; and
(B) The client is advised in writing that the client may
seek the advice of an independent lawyer of the client's choice
and is given a reasonable opportunity to seek that advice; and
(C) The client thereafter consents in writing to the terms
of the transaction or the terms of the acquisition.6 2
Thus, California permits literary-rights fee agreements between a crimi-
nal defense attorney and his or her client. Yet, it can be argued that
literary-rights fee agreements violate, at least in spirit, the California
Rules of Professional Conduct. Specifically, Rule 3-300 allows an attor-
ney to acquire a possessory interest adverse to his or her client; however,
it requires that the terms be "fair and reasonable."6 It seems questiona-
ble whether an agreement to give away literary rights can ever be fair
because the typical defendant who enters into such an agreement has no
other way to attain his or her counsel of choice.64
D. California's Criminal Antiprofit Statute
In addition to constitutional and ethical issues, California courts
must also consider section 2225 of the California Civil Code,65 which
subjects to a constructive trust "[a]ll proceeds from the preparation for
the purpose of sale, the sale of rights to, or the sale of materials that
include or are based on the story of a felony for which a convicted felon
was convicted."166 A superior court then may distribute such proceeds to
persons whom the felon physically, mentally or emotionally injured.67
62. CAL. RULES, supra note 16, Rule 3-300.
63. Id
64. See Maxwell v. Superior Court, 30 Cal. 3d 606, 615 n.4, 639 P.2d 248, 253 n.4, 180
Cal. Rptr. 177, 182 n.4 (1982).
65. CAL. CIV. CODE § 2225 (West Supp. 1990).
66. Id. § 2225(b). The federal government and some states have statutes similar to section
2225. See, eg., 18 U.S.C. § 3681 (1988) (court has discretion to order defendants to forfeit
proceeds received from literary-rights fee agreements); ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-4202
(1989) (literary-rights fee agreements void unless contract provides for payment of money re-
ceived under agreement to be placed into crime victim account); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-14-
31(a)(2)-(3) (1982) (consideration received for contract by accused or person convicted of
crime must be deposited in escrow account and payable to his or her victims); N.Y. EXEC.
LAW § 632-a (McKinney 1982 & Supp. 1990) (proceeds from literary-rights fee agreements
must be submitted to escrow account for benefit of crime victims).
67. CAL. CIV. CODE § 2225(c). The court may also distribute up to 90% of the proceeds
to pay reasonable attorney's fees. Id. § 2225(d). All persons seeking proceeds under this stat-
ute must bring an action in superior court within five years after the later of: (1) the time
payment of the proceeds to the felon, or (2) the date of conviction. Id. § 2225(b), (c).
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LITERAR Y-RIGHTS FEE AGREEMENTS
This statute does not specifically address literary-rights fee agreements,68
and California courts have not yet applied this statute to any such agree-
ment. Therefore, the effect of section 2225 on such agreements is
unclear.69
III. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
Although the United States Constitution and California's ethical
rules do not proscribe literary-rights fee agreements, such agreements
pose serious obstacles to a defendant's ability to enjoy his or her right to
conflict-free counsel.7 ° If, however, a defendant wants to assume the risk
of conflicted counsel by waiving his or her sixth amendment rights,
courts may allow such a waiver. Under such circumstances, however,
the defendant's personal interest in waiving his or her constitutional
rights may compete with the public's interest in preserving the integrity
of the judicial system.71 In these cases, courts may separate and balance
these two interests.72
A. The Defendant's Rights
1. The right to waive counsel
All criminal defendants have a right to counsel.73 In 1975, the
United States Supreme Court, in Faretta v. California,74 decided that
criminal defendants are entitled to waive their sixth amendment right to
68. See id. § 2225. Arguably, however, section 2225 does not proscribe literary-rights fee
agreements. See section 2225, which states: "Prior to any distribution of any proceeds to a
[victim], the court shall determine whether.., a portion of the proceeds is needed to cover [the
defendant's] reasonable attorney's fees...." Id. § 2225(d); accord Okuda, CriminalAntiprofit
Laws: Some Thoughts in Favor of their Constitutionality, 76 CAL. L. REv. 1353, 1365 (1988).
"A criminal may also enter a contract to raise money for her most pressing need, her criminal
defense. The California statute allows the criminal to use her crime story profits to pay private
counsel fees." Okuda, supra, at 1365.
69. It is clear, however, that the purpose of section 2225 is different from the purpose of
the Model Rules proscribing literary-rights fee agreements. Compare Act of Sept. 21, 1983, ch.
1016, § 1, 1983 Cal. Stat. 3581, 3581 (codified as amended at CAL. CIV. CODE § 2225 (West
Supp. 1990)) (purpose of California's criminal antiprofit statute is to compensate victims of
felonies) with MODEL RULES, supra note 3, Rule 1.8 comment 3 (purpose of Model Rules is to
protect defendants from conflicted counsel).
70. Maxwell v. Superior Court, 30 Cal. 3d 606, 616-18, 639 P.2d 248, 253-55, 180 Cal.
Rptr. 177, 182-84 (1982).
71. Id. at 616, 639 P.2d at 253, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 182.
72. See id.
73. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The sixth amendment right to counsel has been applied to
the states through the fourteenth amendment. Gideon v. Wainright, 372 U.S. 335, 340 (1963);
U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV.
74. 422 U.S. 806 (1975).
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legal counsel and represent themselves.75 In Faretta, the Court held that
a defendant's choice of self-representation is a personal right that is "nec-
essarily implied by the structure of the [Sixth] Amendment.
' 7 6
Faretta, however, may not be applicable to waivers of conflict-free
counsel. When defendants give up their right to counsel and represent
themselves, they give up many of the benefits associated with the right to
counsel." In contrast, when defendants exercise their right to counsel,
they automatically gain the additional sixth amendment protections of
conflict-free counsel and effective assistance of counsel.78
If a defendant exercises his or her right to counsel, but waives the
right to conflict-free counsel, the waiver must be made competently and
intelligently. 79 Several larger questions regarding waiver remain, includ-
ing: (a) whether courts should be left with the exclusive burden of deter-
mining the adequacy of such waivers; (b) whether the defendant alone
should make the decision; (c) whether certain waivers should be declared
invalid by statute; and, (d) whether certain waivers should simply be de-
clared per se unconstitutional.8
2. The right to counsel of choice
The concept of effective representation contemplates that a defend-
ant should have counsel of choice."1 A lack of rapport and mutual confi-
dence between clients and lawyers may severely undermine the quality of
representation. 2 The United States Supreme Court, however, has held
that criminal defendants have no absolute constitutional right to counsel
of their choice.83 The Supreme Court has interpreted the sixth amend-
75. Id. at 821. Prose is defined as "[a]ppearing for oneself, as in the case of one who does
not retain a lawyer and appears for himself in court." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1099 (5th
ed. 1979).
76. Faretta, 422 U.S. at 819.
77. IaM at 835. For example, such defendants give up their right to claim ineffective assist-
ance of counsel and possibly gain a reversal on appeal. Id. at 834-35 & n.46.
78. See Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 3444-45 (1980) (constitutional safeguard of effec-
tive assistance applies whether counsel appointed or retained); Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S.
475, 484 (1978) (defendants entitled to counsel free from conflicts of interest arising from
multiple representation); People v. Ledesma, 43 Cal. 3d 171, 215, 729 P.2d 839, 858, 233 Cal.
Rptr. 404, 432 (1987) (defendant entitled to effective assistance, not bare assistance of counsel).
79. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970); Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708,
724 (1948).
80. For a discussion of possible remedies to protect defendants' sixth amendment rights,
see infra notes 229-33 and accompanying text.
81. Maxwell v. Superior Court, 30 Cal. 3d 606, 613, 639 P.2d 248, 251, 180 Cal. Rptr. 177,
180-81 (1981).
82. Id.
83. Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 13-14 n.6 (1983).
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ment narrowly-to serve primarily as a guardian of the defendant's right
to effective advocacy rather than as a guarantor of choice of counsel.84
B. The Public's Interests
The public has a legitimate interest in the fair administration of jus-
tice. This interest, however, may be threatened by literary-rights fee
agreements."5 In evaluating the validity of a literary-rights fee agree-
ment, Justice Richardson of the California Supreme Court stated:
Contracts of the type herein presented will appear to the eye
and ear of the average layman as indistinguishable from run-of-
the-mill commercial or public relations agency agreements....
[T]he engrafting of this device on the judicial process will inevi-
tably dilute public acceptance and understanding of legal advo-
cacy founded on a fiduciary relationship of complete trust and
confidentiality between attorney and client which is directed
solely toward the advancement and vindication of the client's
legal rights, not counsel's fiscal advantage. Counsel cannot si-
multaneously wear the hat of a literary or theatrical agent
whose goal is commercial promotion and the hat of a counselor
at law who is guided by strict ethical constraints.86
Furthermore, the public, as a body of taxpayers, has an interest in
the efficient operation of the courts.8 7 On one hand, if a court accepts a
defendant's waiver of conflict-free counsel and the defendant is con-
victed, such a defendant will likely appeal the adequacy of that waiver,
84. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689 (1984); United States v. Cronic, 466
U.S. 648, 657 n.21 (1984) ("The appropriate [sixth amendment] inquiry focuses on the adver-
sarial process, not on the accused's relationship with his lawyer as such."). The limit upon
choice of counsel is reinforced indirectly in other areas of the law as well. For example, a
defendant may not be represented by an advocate, other than himself, who is not a member of
the bar. Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 159 (1988); United States v. Whitesel, 543 F.2d
1176, 1180 (6th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 967 (1977); United States v. Cooper, 493
F.2d 473, 474 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 859 (1974); Turner v. ABA, 407 F. Supp. 451,
477 (N.D. Tex. 1975). Furthermore, a defendant needing a public defender has counsel ap-
pointed by the trial court and receives no opportunity to influence the court's choice of coun-
sel. Tibbett v. Hand, 294 F.2d 68, 73 (10th Cir. 1961); see Tague, An Indigent's Right to the
Attorney of His Choice, 27 STAN. L. REV. 73, 79-80 (1974). Finally, a court may recuse a
defendant's counsel of choice if such representation somehow interferes with the effective ad-
ministration of justice. Wheat, 486 U.S. at 160; United States v. Poulack, 556 F.2d 83, 86 (1st
Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 986 (1977).
85. Maxwell v. Superior Court, 30 Cal. 3d 606, 632, 639 P.2d 248,264, 180 Cal. Rptr. 177,
193 (1982) (Richardson, J., dissenting).
86. Id.
87. See United States v. Martinez, 616 F.2d 185, 188 (5th Cir. 1980) (recognizing the
public's interest in the economical administration of criminal law).
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thereby creating additional costs for the taxpayers."8 On the other hand,
if a trial court denies a defendant's waiver and appoints conflict-free
counsel over that defendant's objections, the defendant may challenge
the propriety of the trial court's actions in denying the waiver.8 9 More-
over, recent United States Supreme Court decisions suggest that chal-
lenging the denial of defendants' waivers of their rights to conflict-free
counsel will not prove fruitful.90
C. Balancing the Defendant's Rights Against the Public's Interests
In Wheat v. United States,91 the United States Supreme Court at-
tempted to balance the criminal defendant's right to waive the sixth
amendment 92 right to conflict-free counsel against the public's interest in
the fair administration of the judicial system.93 Wheat was convicted in a
United States district court of conspiracy to possess large quantities of
marijuana with intent to distribute.94 The trial court denied his request
to waive conflict-free counsel and be represented by the same attorney as
his co-defendant, and Wheat appealed. 95 Affirming the conviction, the
Supreme Court held that trial courts possess broad discretion to refuse
waivers of conflict-free counsel.96 The Court stated:
[W]e think the district court must be allowed substantial lati-
tude in refusing waivers of conflicts of interest not only in those
rare cases where an actual conflict may be demonstrated before
trial, but in the more common cases where a potential for con-
flict exists which may or may not burgeon into an actual con-
flict as the trial progresses. 97
Drawing upon precedent, the Court noted that "'the appropriate
[sixth amendment] inquiry focuses on the adversarial process, not on the
accused's relationship with his lawyer as such.' "98 Therefore, "trial
courts... have an independent duty to ensure that criminal defendants
88. See United States v. Vowteras, 500 F.2d 1210, 1211 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
1069 (1974).
89. Maxwell, 30 Cal. 3d at 634, 639 P.2d at 265, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 194 (Richardson, J.,
dissenting).
90. See Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153 (1988); Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 261
(1981); Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335 (1980); Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475 (1978).
91. 486 U.S. 153 (1988).
92. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
93. Wheat, 486 U.S. at 160.
94. United States v. Wheat, 813 F.2d 1399, 1400-01 (9th Cir. 1987).
95. Wheat, 486 U.S. at 156.
96. Id. at 163.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 159 (quoting United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 657 n.21 (1984)).
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receive a trial that is fair and does not contravene the Sixth
Amendment."99
The trial court's power and duty to deny a waiver of conflict-free
counsel stems from the same power courts have long enjoyed to disqual-
ify conflicted counsel.l"o The question that remains unclear after Wheat,
however, is when, if ever, the trial court has a duty to deny a waiver of
conflict-free counsel to protect the public's interest. Wheat granted
courts broad permission to deny waivers to fulfill a public duty,10 1 but
was silent regarding what circumstances might require denial of a waiver.
Arguably, when present or potential conflicts of interest obviously
threaten the public confidence in the judicial system, the trial court must
deny a waiver.
One federal court, in United States v. Hobson,102 articulated a test
for determining when counsel should be disqualified for public interest
reasons.103 In Hobson, the defendant, Hobson, was charged with drug
trafficking." ° Two witnesses informed Hobson's attorney that his client
was guilty, 0 ' and because they were expected to testify on that issue, the
trial court disqualified the attorney and denied Hobson's waiver of a con-
flict.106 The defendant appealed the disqualification.10 7
The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit believed the proposed
testimony would create an appearance of impropriety that would violate
the state's ethical rules and erode public confidence in the judicial sys-
tem. 108 Affirming the trial court's decision, the court of appeals held that
an attorney should be disqualified if: (1) a real possibility of impropriety
exists, and (2) the likelihood of public suspicion outweighs the social in-
terests which will be served by the lawyer's continuing representation in
99. Id. at 161.
100. See In re Paradyne Corp., 803 F.2d 604, 611 n.16 (11th Cir. 1986) ("right to counsel
... does not override the broader societal interests in the effective administration of justie...
or in the maintenance of 'public confidence in the integrity of our legal system'" (quoting
United States v. Hobson, 672 F.2d 825, 828 (11th Cir. 1982))); In re Grand Jury Subpoena
Served Upon Doe, 781 F.2d 238, 251 (2d Cir. 1985) ("courts have the power and duty to
disqualify counsel where the public interest in maintaining the integrity of the judicial system
outweighs the accused's constitutional right"), cert denied sub nom. Roe v. United States, 475
U.S. 1108 (1986); United States v. Silva, 611 F.2d 78, 79 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v.
Carrigan, 543 F.2d 1053, 1058 (2d Cir. 1976) (Lumbard, J., concurring).
101. Wheat, 486 U.S. at 162.
102. 672 F.2d 825 (11th Cir. 1982).
103. Id. at 828.




108. Id. at 828-29.
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the case. 109
Applying the test to Hobson's situation, the court found both ele-
ments fulfilled.' 10 The court further ruled that "the defendant is not free
to waive the problem presented here . . because the ethical violation
involves public perception of the lawyer and the legal system rather than
some difficulty in the attorney's effective representation of Hobson." '
California courts have acknowledged that waivers of a potential
conflict of interest may pose a threat to the public's confidence in the
criminal justice system." 2 They have been unwilling, however, to deny a
waiver of conflict-free counsel on public interest grounds.
11 3
IV. PROBLEMS WITH EXISTING LAW
In order to obtain a reversal of a conviction based on conflicted rep-
resentation, a criminal defendant in California must prove that: (1) the
trial court knew or should have known of a potential conflict; (2) the trial
court failed to inquire into and resolve the conflict either by assigning
substitute counsel or obtaining a valid waiver; and, (3) the defendant was
actually prejudiced by the conflict. 4 Each of these proof requirements
poses a substantial hurdle for defendants to overcome and, therefore, un-
dermines the defendant's constitutional right to effective assistance of
counsel.
109. Id. at 828.
110. Id. at 828-29.
111. Id at 829.
112. See, e.g., Maxwell v. Superior Court, 30 Cal. 3d 606, 627, 639 P.2d 248, 261, 180 Cal.
Rptr. 177, 190 (1982) (Richardson, J., dissenting) (defendant needs "counsel, not only of un-
questioned professional competence, but also counsel whose allegiance to him is total and unal-
loyed" (citation omitted)); People v. Barboza, 29 Cal. 3d 375, 379, 627 P.2d 188, 190, 173 Cal.
Rptr. 458, 460 (1981) (public defender required to avoid "'any relation which would prevent
him from devoting his entire energies to his client's interests'" (quoting Anderson v. Eaton,
211 Cal. 113, 116, 293 P. 788, 790 (1930))); People v. Pope, 23 Cal. 3d 412, 422-23, 590 P.2d
859, 864-65, 152 Cal. Rptr. 732, 737-38 (1979); People v. Corona, 80 Cal. App. 3d 684, 720,
145 Cal. Rptr. 894, 915 (1978).
113. See Maxwell, 30 Cal. 3d at 615, 639 P.2d at 253, 180 Cal. Rptr at 182. The Maxwell
court recognized that an argument may be made that literary-rights fee agreements are against
the public interest, but did not find the public interest to be a factor in analyzing the validity of
literary-rights fee agreements. See id. at 616-22, 639 P.2d at 253-58, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 182-87.
Other states have taken an approach to literary-rights fee agreements that requires proceeds
from such agreements to be deposited in an escrow account and payments made from that
account to the victims of the crimes. See, e.g., Aiuz. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-4202, 27-3401
(1989); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-14-31(a)(2)-(3) (1982); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 70, para. 403
(Smith-Hurd 1989); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 632-a (McKinney 1983 & Supp. 1989).
114. See Maxwell, 30 Cal. 3d at 616-22, 639 P.2d at 253-54, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 182-83.
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A. The Procedure for Responding to a Discovered Conflict
1. General procedures
Even where a trial court fulfills its duty to inquire into the possibility
of a conflict of interest, the procedures to remedy the conflict may be
inadequate. If a court learns that the potential for a damaging conflict
exists, the court must approach the defendant with its findings and offer
the defendant a choice of waiving the right to conflict-free representation
or requesting substitute counsel. 1 ' Before a waiver will be effective,
however, the trial court must find that the waiver was made in a knowing
and intelligent manner.'
1 6
2. Procedures as applied to literary-rights fee agreements in
California
In Maxwell v. Superior Court,"7 the California Supreme Court up-
held a waiver of an alleged literary-rights fee agreement.' 8 In Maxwell,
the defendant, charged with ten murders and four robberies, sought rep-
resentation by private counsel with whom he had negotiated a literary-
rights fee agreement.1 9 Counsel and Maxwell entered into a detailed
and comprehensive waiver and fee contract, which made clear-all possi-
ble dangers of such an agreement.1 2 Specifically, the agreement dis-
closed possible conflicts and prejudice to Maxwell's right to counsel and
included a "catch-all" paragraph stating that when unforeseen conflicts
arise, counsel will act in Maxwell's best interest. 21
The trial court, sua sponte, questioned Maxwell at length about his
understanding of all the terms of the agreement and the dangers of con-
flict therein.' 22 The court then concluded that literary-rights fee agree-
ments, by their nature, are inherently prejudicial to criminal
defendants.12 The court recused Maxwell's private counsel and ap-
pointed a substitute counsel.' 2 Maxwell then obtained review of the
115. People v. Bonin, 47 Cal. 3d 808, 837, 765 P.2d 460, 476, 254 Cal. Rptr. 298, 314
(1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1506 (1990); see Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 261, 273-74 (1981).
116. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970) (waivers of constitutional rights must
be "knowing, intelligent acts done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and
likely consequences.").
117. 30 Cal. 3d 606, 639 P.2d 248, 180 Cal. Rptr. 177 (1982).
118. Id. at 621, 639 P.2d at 257, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 186.
119. Id. at 610, 639 P.2d at 249-50, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 178-79.
120. See id at 610-11, 639 P.2d at 250, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 179.
121. Id.
122. Id at 611-12, 639 P.2d at 250-51, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 180.
123. Id. at 612, 639 P.2d at 251, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 180.
124. Id.
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recusal decision by seeking a writ of mandate. 2 The California
Supreme Court overturned the trial court's order recusing the chosen
counsel, holding that the trial court had erred in finding Maxwell's initial
waiver invalid. 1
26
In reaching its decision, the supreme court weighed the defendant's
right to be represented by counsel of his choice against the probable con-
flict of entering into a literary-rights fee agreement with his chosen pri-
vate attorney. 127 The court held that given Maxwell's insistence on being
represented by his chosen counsel, any possible conflict arising from the
fact that counsel and Maxwell had entered into a literary-rights fee
agreement was outweighed by the defendant's right to counsel of his
choice.128  In so holding, the court noted that the literary-rights fee
agreement may have improved representation of the client.12 9 The court
also surmised that private defense counsel might conduct a "careful, dili-
gent defense that avoids conviction" because a "quiet strategy that suc-
ceeds may well make a better story than a flamboyant failure. '
130
Therefore, after Maxwell, a defendant who validly waives his sixth
amendment right to effective counsel cannot subsequently claim ineffec-
tive assistance of counsel in California courts.
1 31
B. The Requirement of Knowing and Intelligent Waiver is Inadequate
to Protect a Defendant's Right to Conflict-Free Counsel
1. General requirements of knowing and intelligent waiver
Although defendants have no constitutional right to counsel of
125. Id. A mandate is defined as "[a] precept or order issued upon the decision of an appeal
or writ of error, directing action to be taken, or disposition to be made of case, by inferior
court." BLACK'S LAW DIcTnONARY 867 (5th ed. 1979).
126. Maxwell, 30 Cal. 3d at 622, 639 P.2d at 257, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 187. Vigorous dissents
in the Maxwell decision raised some valid arguments as to the validity of removing counsel
over defendant's objection. See id. at 623, 639 P.2d at 258, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 187 (Bird, C.J.,
concurring and dissenting). Justice Bird felt that a criminal defendant might not be capable of
understanding the full implications of a waiver. Id. at 624, 639 P.2d at 259, 180 Cal. Rptr. at
188 (Bird, C.J., concurring and dissenting). She further pointed out that, as part of the liter-
ary-rights fee agreement, Maxwell had agreed to waive all attorney-client privileges once the
trial had concluded. Id. at 625, 639 P.2d at 259, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 189 (Bird, C.J., concurring
and dissenting). Therefore, if the defendant decided to appeal a conviction, the prosecution
could then call the defense attorney as a witness against the defendant, and the attorney could
be compelled to testify. Id., 639 P.2d at 260, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 189 (Bird, C.J., concurring and
dissenting).
127. Id. at 612-15, 639 P.2d at 251-53, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 180-82.
128. Id. at 615, 639 P.2d at 253, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 182.
129. Id. at 618 n.8, 639 P.2d at 255 n.8, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 184 n.8.
130. Id.
131. Id at 622, 639 P.2d at 257-58, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 187.
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choice, they may waive their right to effective representation. 132 For
such waivers to be valid, however, defendants must waive their rights
knowingly and intelligently. 133 This requirement raises several potential
problems. First, the United States Supreme Court has not defined pre-
cisely the procedure for obtaining a competent and intelligent waiver.' 34
Second, defendants waiving their right to effective representation not
only agree to be represented by counsel who may otherwise be "ineffec-
tive" under the sixth amendment, but they may do so without appreciat-
ing the complexity and significance of conflicts of interest.'35 The logic
in finding that a defendant can waive unforeseeable conflicts knowingly
or intelligently has been questioned by at least two federal courts, which
have invalidated waivers of conflicts when the conflict became apparent
only during trial.'
36
In addition to the problems inherent in defendants waiving conflict-
free counsel, the trial court must also fulfill its duty to ensure the ade-
132. See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835 (1975).
133. People v. Bonin, 47 Cal. 3d 808, 837, 765 P.2d 460, 476, 254 Cal. Rptr. 298, 314
(1989); see Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1969). Most cases addressing a defend-
ant's ability to waive conflict-free counsel knowingly and intelligently involve situations in
which one attorney represented more than one defendant. See, eg., Glasser v. United States,
315 U.S. 60, 76 (1942); United States v. Woods, 544 F.2d 242, 268-89 (6th Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 430 U.S. 969 (1977); United States v. Bernstein, 533 F.2d 775, 787-88 (2d Cir.), cert
denied, 429 U.S. 998 (1976); United States v. Garcia, 517 F.2d 272, 278 (5th Cir. 1975);
United States v. Garafola, 428 F. Supp. 620, 623-24 (D.N.J. 1977), aff'd sub nom. United
States v. Dolan, 570 F.2d 1177 (3d Cir. 1978). Multiple representation raises such concerns as
the attorney's ability to act in the best interest of each defendant without sacrificing the best
interests of the other defendants. People v. Mroczko, 35 Cal. 3d 86, 103-04, 672 P.2d 835,
844-45, 197 Cal. Rptr. 52, 62 (1983). For example, it may be in the best interest of one
defendant (DI) to enter into a plea agreement to get a lighter sentence and avoid trial, but the
co-defendant (132) may need Dl's testimony to prove D2's alibi. See MODEL RULES, supra
note 3, Rule 1.7 comment 7 ("The potential for conflict of interest in representing multiple
defendants in a criminal case is so grave that ordinarily a lawyer should decline to represent
more than one codefendant.").
134. See Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153 (1988) (waiver of right to conflict-free coun-
sel); Faretta, 422 U.S. 806 (waiver of right to counsel); Brady, 397 U.S. 742 (waiver of right to
jury trial); Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24 (1965) (waiver of right to jury trial); Von
Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708 (1948) (waiver of right to counsel); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S.
458 (1938) (waiver of right to counsel). One lower federal court has developed a wide range of
standards. In United States v. Donahue, 560 F.2d 1039 (1st Cir. 1977), the First Circuit held
that if the appellate court believes the trial judge failed to "comment" sufficiently on the dan-
gers facing the defendant in a multiple representation case, the burden shifts to the government
on appeal to show that prejudice to the defendant was unlikely. Id. at 1044. The conviction in
Donahue was reversed because the appellate court could not conclude with certainty that the
potential conflict had not influenced counsel's choice of strategies. Id.
135. Maxwell v. Superior Court, 30 Cal. 3d 606, 630, 639 P.2d 248, 262, 180 Cal. Rptr. 177,
191 (1982).
136. See Buffalo Chief v. South Dakota, 425 F.2d 271, 280 (8th Cir. 1970); Craig v. United
States, 217 F.2d 355, 359 (6th Cir. 1954).
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quacy of the defendant's waiver from a position of ignorance. 137 In these
instances, the trial judge will probably be uninformed about the attor-
ney's theories of defense.1 38 Even if the court has access to such informa-
tion, however, the judge is precluded from making inquiries which
compromise the defendant's right against self-incrimination or the attor-
ney-client privilege.1 39 As a result, trial courts make decisions regarding
waivers of conflict-free counsel without fully considering the defendant's
understanding of the conflict."4
2. Requirement of knowing and intelligent waiver as applied to
literary-rights fee agreements in California
Although courts have applied the general waiver analysis to waivers
of conflicts arising out of counsel with literary-rights fee agreements, lit-
erary-rights fee agreements raise additional conflict of interest problems.
First, unlike the typical conflict of interest case where the attorney's loy-
alty is divided between two defendants, loyalty in literary-rights fee
agreements is divided between the attorney and the client.141 This may
make it more difficult for a defendant to waive the right to conflict-free
representation "knowingly and intelligently." '142 When the attorney's fee
may rise in proportion to public exposure arising from the trial, the attor-
ney's primary interest may not reside with the client.1 43 In fact, attor-
neys may benefit greatly from losing cases involving literary-rights fee
agreements, since it is probable that the public will find that defendants'
convictions provide more interesting reading than their acquittals.
144
Second, as the Maxwell v. Superior Court 145 decision illustrates, the
terms of literary-rights fee agreements may themselves present problems
for the defendant. In Maxwell, the defendant assigned to his private de-
fense attorney all publication rights to his murder trial in return for legal
137. See Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 490-91 (1978); United States v. Paz-Sierra,
367 F.2d 930, 932 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 935 (1967); Garafola, 428 F. Supp. at
624; W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 11.9, at 520 (1985).
138. See Holloway, 435 U.S. at 484; Paz-Sierra, 367 F.2d at 932; Garafola, 428 F. Supp. at
624.
139. Paz-Sierra, 367 F.2d at 932; see also Mroczko, 35 Cal. 3d at 114, 672 P.2d at 853, 197
Cal. Rptr. at 70 (trial judge cannot conduct meaningful inquiry without violating defendant's
fifth and sixth amendment rights).
140. Mroczko, 35 Cal. 3d at 114-15, 672 P.2d at 853, 197 Cal. Rptr. at 70.
141. See Maxwell, 30 Cal. 3d at 616, 639 P.2d at 253, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 182.
142. A valid waiver is more difficult under such circumstances because the defendant no
longer has an independent advisor.
143. Maxwell, 30 Cal. 3d at 622, 639 P.2d at 257, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 187.
144. See id at 611, 639 P.2d at 250, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 179.
145. 30 Cal. 3d 606, 639 P.2d 248, 180 Cal. Rptr. 177 (1982).
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representation."4 The terms of the literary-rights fee agreement resulted
in a waiver of conflict-free counsel.147 The California Supreme Court
held that the trial court established Maxwell's competence in waiving his
rights, and that his insistence on proceeding with his chosen counsel,
despite extensive disclosures made on the record, constituted an adequate
waiver of conflict-free counsel.1
48
This result seems undesirable, however, because the literary-rights
fee agreement itself revealed the unequal bargaining power between the
attorney and Maxwell. 49 First, the agreement specifically stated that
Maxwell's attorney may have had an interest in creating trial publicity,
even if such publicity was at Maxwell's expense. 50 Second, the agree-
ment warned that the attorney could have avoided raising a viable in-
sanity defense because to do so may have called into question Maxwell's
capacity to enter into the agreement, thereby voiding it.151 Third, the
agreement provided that the attorney may have had an interest in seeing
Maxwell sentenced to death because that result might have increased
publicity. 5 ' Fourth, the agreement stated that the attorney's services
did not include representation on appeal." 3 Fifth, Maxwell also agreed
to waive upon demand his attorney-client privilege, as well as his fifth
amendment right against self-incrimination. 1 4 The practical result of
this waiver was that if Maxwell's case were reversed on appeal and re-
tried, his counsel undertook no obligation to represent him and was free
to publish incriminating information about Maxwell, and could have
even been subpoenaed to testify against Maxwell. 55
C. Difficulties in Establishing Prejudice
Even if a defendant demonstrates that the waiver of conflict-free
counsel was not made knowingly and intelligently, the defendant must
still demonstrate that the attorney's conflict prejudiced him at trial.'56
146. Id at 610, 639 P.2d at 250, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 179.
147. Id. at 611, 639 P.2d at 250, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 179.
148. Id at 621, 639 P.2d at 257, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 186.
149. Id at 610-11, 639 P.2d at 250, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 179.
150. Id. at 628, 639 P.2d at 261, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 190 (Richardson, J., dissenting).
151. Id. (Richardson, J., dissenting).
152. Id. (Richardson, J., dissenting).
153. Id. at 626, 639 P.2d at 260, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 189 (Richardson, J., dissenting).
154. Id. (Richardson, J., dissenting).
155. Id. at 625, 639 P.2d at 259-60, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 189 (Bird, C.J., concurring and
dissenting).
156. Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 349-50 (1980). The appeals process for claims of
ineffective assistance of counsel differs somewhat between courts; generally, both state and
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This presents a formidable obstacle for a defendant attempting to estab-
lish a conflict of counsel claim.
1. The general duty of inquiry
When reviewing conflict of counsel claims, appellate courts first de-
termine whether the trial court had an initial duty to make an inquiry
into the conflict. 157 Such a duty should be found where the trial court
knew or reasonably should have known of a potential or actual con-
ffict.' 58 If the appellate court finds that such a duty existed and that the
trial court breached the duty, the case should be remanded to the trial
court for a determination on whether a conflict adversely affected his
lawyer's performance.'59 On the other hand, if the trial court had no
initial duty to inquire, the case should not be remanded."W The defend-
ant, however, must demonstrate that an actual conflict of interest ad-
versely affected his lawyer's performance.' 6' After this inquiry, if the
reviewing court believes that a conflict of interest existed and prejudiced
the defendant, the case should be reversed.' 62
In Wood v. Georgia,1 3 the United States Supreme Court found that
the trial court failed in its initial duty of inquiry.16  The conflict in Wood
arose because the defense attorney represented multiple defendants.
1 6 1
The defendants stated that their employer paid for the attorney, who was
representing all three defendants.' 66 The defendants further revealed
that their employer had promised to pay for any fines and post any neces-
sary bonds. 167 The employer failed, however, to pay the fines assessed
against his employees, leading to the employees' probation
revocations." 8
In reviewing the record, the Supreme Court found that the trial
court had a duty to inquire because the attorney's conflict of interest was
evident-the employer's decision not to pay the fines subjected the de-
federal courts follow their own methods of dividing the responsibility for ensuring effective
counsel. See infra notes 161-78 and accompanying text.
157. Sullivan, 446 U.S. at 347.
158. Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 261, 273-74 (1981); Sullivan, 446 U.S. at 347.
159. Wood, 450 U.S. at 273-74.
160. See Sullivan, 446 U.S. at 349-50.
161. Iad at 348.
162. Id. at 348-50.
163. 450 U.S. 261 (1981).
164. Id. at 272.
165. Id. at 266.
166. Id
167. Id
168. Id at 267.
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fendants to the probation revocation charges.'69 Accordingly, the Court
remanded the case for a determination of whether the possible conflict of
interest actually existed at the time of the probation hearing or earlier. 70
2. The duty of inquiry as applied to literary-rights fee agreements in
California
California's approach to the duty of inquiry, articulated in People v.
Bonin, 7 I sharply departs from the framework of Wood.'72 In Bonin, the
California Supreme Court initially found that the trial court had no duty
to inquire into Bonin's literary-rights fee agreement with his attorney.'73
Upon finding that no duty existed, the California Supreme Court ceased
investigation of the alleged conflict based on the literary-rights fee agree-
ment.'74 The Bonin court's failure to inquire further is inconsistent with
the United States Supreme Court's precedent requiring the appellate
court to review the trial record to determine if an actual conflict existed
that prejudiced the defendant at trial, even absent a duty of inquiry."'
A finding of no duty to inquire should not alone determine a defend-
ant's right to relief for ineffective counsel.' 6 While the attorney bears
partial responsibility for disclosing conflicts, the court must also share
part of that responsibility.' 77 Indeed, if defense counsel is so ineffective
that he or she fails to bring conflicts to the court's attention, the defend-
ant should not be denied the opportunity to prove that ineffectiveness on
appeal.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 273-74.
171. 47 Cal. 3d 808, 765 P.2d 460, 254 Cal. Rptr. 298 (1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1506
(1990).
172. Compare Wood, 450 U.S. at 273 (court has duty to recognize possibility of disqualify-
ing conflict of interest) with Bonin, 47 Cal. 3d at 838, 765 P.2d at 477, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 315
(court "cannot be deemed to have known, or to have had reason to know, of the possibility of a
conflict in this regard").
173. Bonin, 47 Cal. 3d at 838, 765 P.2d at 476, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 315.
174. Id., 765 P.2d at 476-77, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 315. Ultimately, the Bonin court found that
the trial court failed to follow through on investigating a second conflict-prior representation.
Id., 765 P.2d at 477, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 315. The prosecution intended to call a witness who
had formerly been represented by the same law firm that was representing Bonin in his trial.
Id. at 825, 765 P.2d at 469, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 307. Although the trial court had inquired into
the potential conflict created by such prior representation, upon finding such conflict likely, the
court did not recuse the conflicted counsel. Id. at 838-39, 765 P.2d at 477, 254 Cal. Rptr. at
315. This failure to act appropriately in the face of a potential conflict constituted error under
Wood. Id. at 839, 765 P.2d at 477, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 316.
175. See Sullivan, 446 U.S. at 348-49.
176. See id.
177. See id. at 346-47.
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D. Problems of Proof
Ineffective assistance of counsel cases are evaluated pursuant to one
of two standards of review.' 7 ' In most instances, the defendant receives a
limited presumption of prejudice. In such cases the defendant must
demonstrate that an actual conflict of interest existed and that the con-
flict adversely affected counsel's performance at trial.179 Under the sec-
ond standard, the court presumes prejudice without inquiry into
counsel's actual performance at trial. 180 California courts have not yet
addressed which standard applies to cases involving literary-rights fee
agreements. Ineffective assistance of counsel claims based upon an estab-
lished conflict of interest, however, have been subject to the first stan-
dard, which requires that the defendant prove that an actual conflict
adversely affected counsel's performance at trial. 81 An examination of
these two standards of review, however, indicates that a conflict of inter-
est based on a literary-rights fee agreement should fall into the second
category.'8 2 This section reviews the two standards of review and then
concludes that the presumed prejudice standard should apply in literary-
rights fee agreement cases.
1. Limited presumption of prejudice: Strickland v. Washington
In Strickland v. Washington,"8 3 the United States Supreme Court
applied the limited presumption of proof standard to an ineffective assist-
ance of counsel claim. 8 4 In Strickland, the defendant was convicted of
committing three brutal murders during a three-day period. 8 At
Strickland's sentencing hearing, his counsel argued that the defendant
had no history of criminal activity and that he had committed the crimes
under extreme mental or emotional disturbance. 6 However, counsel
failed to introduce character witnesses or evidence concerning Strick-
land's character and emotional state.' 7 He also failed to obtain a presen-
tencing report.1 8 Strickland pleaded guilty against his attorney's wishes
178. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 692 (1984).
179. Id
180. Id ; see United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 662 & n.31 (1984).
181. Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 349-50 (1980).
182. See infra notes 214-28 and accompanying text.
183. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
184. Id. at 693.
185. Id. at 671-72.
186. Id. at 673-74.
187. Id at 673.
188. Id.
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and was sentenced to death. 89 Strickland appealed, but the United
States Supreme Court rejected Strickland's claim that he had been denied
effective assistance of counsel. 9 ° In reaching its holding, the Court rea-
soned that, under the principle of reversible error, the defendant has the
burden of showing by a preponderance of the evidence that "there is a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the
result of the proceeding would have been different."''
Counsel's error, according to the Court, should not be judged by
looking objectively at a checklist of basic requirements of attorney com-
petency.' 92 The Court noted that the right to effective counsel cannot be
violated for its own sake, but only to the extent that denial of the right
deprives the defendant of a fair trial.' 93 Applying this standard, the
Court examined the attorney's performance and found that Strickland's
attorney's conduct was not unreasonable, but even if it were, that Strick-
land suffered insufficient prejudice to reverse his death sentence."'
The Strickland Court pointed out that a reviewing court must not
judge counsel's trial tactics with hindsight; instead, it should focus on
counsel's perspective at the time of the trial court's decision. 9 The
Court further noted that a reviewing court must presume that counsel's
choice of trial tactics falls within "the wide range of professionally com-
petent assistance."' 96 A presumption of effective assistance is required
because assessment of a trial counsel's performance after the fact is ex-
tremely difficult for the reviewing court.1 9 7 Also, absent this presump-
tion, counsel may be discouraged from selecting a defense strategy which
may best suit the facts. 9
2. Presumed prejudice: United States v. Cronic
Generally, a defendant claiming a violation of his or her right to
effective assistance of counsel bears the burden of demonstrating a consti-
tutional violation.' 99 Accordingly, the Strickland Court stated that con-
flicts of interest create a limited presumption of prejudice.2 Under this
189. Id. at 672.
190. Id. at 700.
191. Id. at 694.
192. Id. at 688.
193. Id. at 689.
194. Id. at 698-99.
195. Id. at 689.
196. Id. at 690.
197. Id. at 689.
198. Id. at 690.
199. Cronic, 466 U.S. at 658.
200. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692.
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approach, prejudice is presumed only after the defendant demonstrates
that counsel established an actual conflict of interest existed and that the
conflict adversely affected counsel's performance.2 °' In United States v.
Cronic,20 2 however, the United States Supreme Court enumerated certain
circumstances that are so likely to prejudice the defendant that prejudice
could be presumed without requiring any further showing by the
defendant. °3
In Cronic, the defendant was an alleged "check-kiter" whose re-
tained counsel withdrew shortly before the trial date.2 4 The trial court
appointed a young lawyer with a real estate practice to represent Cronic,
but allowed him only twenty-five days for pretrial preparation. 20 5 It had
taken the government over four and one-half years to investigate the
case.20 6 Cronic was convicted and appealed his conviction on an ineffec-
tive assistance of counsel theory.
20 7
In analyzing Cronic's ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the
Court listed circumstances that are so likely to prejudice a defendant that
prejudice is presumed without any additional showing by the defend-
ant. 08 Such circumstances include instances where counsel is denied
completely, or denied at a critical stage of the proceedings. 2°9 Addition-
ally, if counsel entirely fails to subject the prosecution's case to meaning-
ful adversarial testing, then the adversary process is presumptively
unreliable.210 Further, the Court commented that:
Circumstances [reaching constitutional error of the first magni-
tude] may be present on some occasions when although counsel
is available to assist the accused during trial, the likelihood that
any lawyer, even a fully competent one, could provide effective
assistance is so small that a presumption of prejudice is appro-
priate without inquiry into the actual conduct of trial.2 '
The Court found that Cronic's case was not one in which the surround-
ing circumstances made it unlikely that he received effective assistance of
counsel.212 Thus, Cronic bore the burden of proving the sixth amend-
201. Id.
202. 466 U.S. 648 (1984).
203. Id. at 658-59.
204. Id at 649.
205. Id
206. Id.
207. Id at 652.
208. Id at 658-59 & n.25, 662 & n.31.
209. Id. at 658-59 & n.25.
210. Id. at 659.
211. Id. at 659-60.
212. Id. at 666.
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ment violation.213
3. The better standard for literary-rights fee agreement cases
Unfortunately, the limited presumption of prejudice requirement
sidesteps the fact that a defendant is claiming violation of a fundamental
constitutional right-the right to effective assistance of counsel.214 De-
spite the Strickland Court's statement to the contrary, courts and com-
mentators have argued that the right to effective counsel deserves
protection in and of itself21 ' because the public maintains an interest in a
minimum standard of effective advocacy.21 6 Thus, whether or not the
error prejudiced the defendant, a new trial should be granted when coun-
sel falls below a minimum standard of competency.
217
Strickland's limited presumption of prejudice analysis raises several
issues. First, in conflict of interest situations, establishing that a conflict
affected counsel's performance is virtually impossible to prove because
213. Id.
214. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686.
215. See, e.g., United States v. Decoster, 624 F.2d 196, 214 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Genego, The
Future of Effective Assistance of Counsel: Performance Standards and Competent Representa-
tion, 22 Am. CRIM. L. Rnv. 181, 200 (1984); Note, Criminal Codefendants and the Sixth
Amendment: The Case for Separate Counsel, 58 GEo. L.J. 369, 387 (1969).
216. See Decoster, 624 F.2d at 214. In Decoster, Judge Leventhal placed all ineffectiveness
claims on a continuum. Id. at 201-03. Categorical violations comprising state-sanctioned
"structural and procedural" impediments to effective representation lay at one end of the con-
tinuum. Id. at 201. Such violations require automatic reversal. Id. At the other end of the
continuum lay judgmental violations, comprising cases where attorney incompetence consti-
tutes the violation. Id. at 202. In such cases, reversal must be determined after a fact-specific
inquiry reveals a showing of prejudice. Id. at 203. Finally, claims of ineffective counsel due to
conflicts of interest lay in the middle of the continuum. Id. at 202. A conflict must be shown
to exist, based upon specific facts. Id. However, once the court finds a conflict, prejudice is
presumed. Id. A subsequent United States Supreme Court case demonstrated that, even in
conflict cases, a defendant must prove prejudice on the facts. See Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S.
261, 272 (1981).
Dissenting in Decoster, Judge Bazelon argued that a reversible violation of the sixth
amendment should be established merely by showing a departure from one of a set of guide-
lines governing a minimum level of attorney competency. Decoster, 624 F.2d at 264 (Bazelon,
J., dissenting). Thus, Bazelon asserted that the following tasks can never be ignored: (1) con-
ferring with the client without delay and as often as necessary; (2) fully discussing potential
strategies and tactical choices; (3) advising the client of his rights and taking all actions neces-
sary to preserve them; and (4) conducting appropriate factual and legal investigations. Id at
276 (Bazelon, J., dissenting). Once the reviewing court determines the substantial violation of
one of these specified duties, the burden shifts to the government to prove, beyond a reasonable
doubt, that the error was harmless. Id. at 275 (Bazelon, J., dissenting).
Others have agreed with Judge Bazelon that any judgmental approach is erroneous in
evaluating sixth amendment claims of ineffective assistance. See Smithburn & Springman,
Effective Assistance of Counse" In Quest of a Uniform Standard of Review, 17 WAKE FOREST
L. REV. 497, 523 (1981).
217. See supra notes 214-16 and accompanying text.
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one cannot surmise the subjective reasoning of counsel in implementing
or forgoing a trial strategy.21 Thus, a defendant faces a formidable task
in proving that a particular conflict led to a certain strategy.219 Second,
even a trial record containing overwhelming evidence of guilt may not
accurately indicate a conflict's impact on counsel's performance, because
a claim of prejudice based on a conflict of interest is "based on a circum-
stance not appearing in the record, that allegedly affect[ed counsel's]
judgment.
220
Considering these problems raised by the Strickland standard, the
conflict presented by a literary-rights fee agreement fits more appropri-
ately into the presumed prejudice standard articulated in Cronic. In
Maxwell v. Superior Court,221 the California Supreme Court assessed the
validity of a literary-rights fee agreement, which arguably presents cir-
cumstances posited by the Cronic Court, where the likelihood of any law-
yer providing effective assistance "is so small that a presumption of
prejudice is appropriate without inquiry into the actual conduct at
trial., 222 The literary-rights fee agreement in Maxwell expressly warned
the defendant that the agreement may result in possible conflicts and
prejudice.223 Specifically, it declared that counsel may wish to (1) create
damaging publicity to enhance exploitation value; (2) avoid mental de-
fenses; and (3) see the defendant convicted and even sentenced to death
for publicity value.224 In addition, although Maxwell's counsel promised
in the agreement to provide the best defense possible,225 the promise
lacked real meaning because counsel merely pledged a pre-existing
duty.2 26 Finally, literary-rights fee agreements contemplate that the at-
torney will conduct the defense with an eye toward earning his or her
livelihood, rather than the defendant's best interests.227 Accordingly, the
circumstances in Maxwell presented a situation where applying the pre-
sumption of prejudice standard may have been appropriate.228
218. See Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 75-76 (1942).
219. Id
220. United States v. Hearst, 638 F.2d 1190, 1195 (1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 938 (1981).
221. 30 Cal. 3d 606, 639 P.2d 248, 180 Cal. Rptr. 177 (1982).
222. Cronic, 466 U.S. at 660.
223. Maxwell, 30 Cal. 3d at 611, 639 P.2d at 250, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 179.
224. Id
225. Id
226. I at 628, 639 P.2d at 261, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 191 (Richardson, J., dissenting).
227. People v. Corona, 80 Cal. App. 3d 684, 720, 145 Cal. Rptr. 894, 915 (1978).




Several possible solutions may be appropriate to protect defendants
from conflicts of interest arising from literary-rights fee agreements. The
most drastic measure to avoid the problems raised by such agreements
would be to outlaw them entirely, either by legislative enactment 229 or a
judicially established rule of criminal procedure.2 3 ° Prohibiting literary-
rights fee agreements would shift responsibility for avoiding conflicts
back to the attorney and the trial court. This remedy would best protect
the sixth amendment rights of criminal defendants by eliminating poten-
tial conflicts of interest caused by defense attorneys obtaining a financial
interest in the defendant's literary-rights. Similarly, the California courts
or legislature could require counsel to submit an affidavit pledging the
nonexistence of any literary-rights fee agreements.
A9 an alternative, the California State Bar could adopt DR 5-104(B)
of the Model Code ,231 which expressly prohibits literary-rights fee agree-
ments. This alternative, however, would be less effective than a legisla-
tive response because disciplining attorneys for ethical violations is
merely discretionary with the courts.23 2
Another possible remedy to protect a defendant from conflicts of
interest arising from literary-rights fee agreements is a law allowing such
agreements, but requiring that the attorney- charge a reasonable fee
rather than a percentage of future profits and collect that fee from publi-
cation proceeds after exhausting all levels of defense. Such a law would
minimize the attorney's interest in sensationalizing the defendant's trial
because any profits in excess of the established fees would go to the de-
229. California has a statute focusing on literary rights. CAL. CIV. CODE § 2225 (West
Supp. 1990). This statute, however, focuses on compensating victims and not protecting de-
fendants. See supra notes 65-69 and accompanying text. The author, therefore, proposes en-
actment of an additional statute to specifically proscribe literary-rights fee agreements.
230. Rules to protect against similar conflict of interest situations currently exist. See, eg.,
FED. R. CRIM. P. 44(c). Rule 44(c) provides in pertinent part:
[Tihe court shall personally inquire with respect to such joint representation and
shall promptly advise each defendant of the right to the effective assistance of coun-
sel, including separate representation. Unless it appears that there is good cause to
believe that no conflict of interest is likely to arise, the court shall take such measures
as may be appropriate to protect each defendant's right to counsel.
Id; accord People v. Barboza, 29 Cal. 3d 375, 381, 627 P.2d 188, 190, 173 Cal. Rptr. 458, 461
(1981) (public defenders should refrain from entering into any contract linking attorney com-
pensation to representation in manner that attorney would possess interest adverse to client's).
Similarly, Judge Richardson, dissenting in Maxwell v. Superior Court, advocated that all liter-
ary-rights fee agreements be banned under a court-drafted rule of criminal procedure. 30 Cal.
3d 606, 636, 639 P.2d 248, 266, 180 Cal. Rptr. 177, 196 (1982) (Richardson, J., dissenting).
231. MODEL CODE, supra note 55, DR 5-104(B).
232. Weir v. State Bar, 23 Cal. 3d 564, 576, 591 P.2d 19, 24, 152 Cal. Rptr. 921, 927 (1979).
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fendant. In addition, the legislation should require the attorney to ab-
stain from any disclosure of information regarding the subject matter of
the litigation until all appeals have been exhausted. The law should pro-
vide that defendants cannot waive the attorney-client privilege until such
time.
At a minimum, courts sahould make it less difficult for defendants
claiming ineffective assistance of counsel based on literary-rights fee
agreements to establish their claims by applying the presumption of prej-
udice standard articulated in United States v. Cronic, rather than the lim-
ited presumption of prejudice set forth in Strickland v. Washington. The
former standard is appropriate because the conflict of interest problems
that literary-rights fee agreements raise make it highly unlikely that any
lawyer could render effective assistance.233
VI. CONCLUSION
In the area of literary-rights fee agreements, California arguably di-
verges from both the constitutional principles governing claims of effec-
tive assistance of counsel and the guidelines embodied in the ABA ethical
rules. Under the existing case law, however, California courts rarely find
that a defendant's sixth amendment right to counsel has been violated by
a literary-rights fee agreement.2 34 Moreover, reversible error appears vir-
tually impossible to prove.
2 31
Cases such as People v. Bonin 2 36 and Maxwell v. Superior Court 
2 37
reveal a trend of relaxation from earlier California law governing con-
flicts of interest. Given the conservative idealogy dominating the present
California Supreme Court, this trend may go unchecked until stopped by
constitutional barriers or, more likely, until the legislature enacts a stat-
ute prohibiting literary-rights fee agreements.
When conflicted counsel is prohibited from representing a defend-
ant, both the defendant and the public benefit.2 38 The defendant benefits
by better representation; the public benefits by having its faith in the judi-
cial system preserved. On the other hand, where the defendant waives
his or her right to conflict-free counsel, it is not only the defendant who
suffers, but the public as well. The defendant may receive inadequate
233. See supra notes 221-28 and accompanying text.
234. See supra notes 128-31 and accompanying text.
235. See supra notes 221-23 and accompanying text.
236. 47 Cal. 3d 808, 765 P.2d 460, 254 Cal. Rptr. 298 (1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1506
(1990).
237. 30 Cal. 3d 606, 639 P.2d 248, 180 Cal. Rptr. 177 (1982).
238. See supra notes 73-89 and accompanying text.
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representation,239 while the public may incur the expense of processing
appeals based on the conflicted representation,2' in addition to losing
confidence in the judicial process.241
239. Maxwell, 30 Cal. 3d at 616, 639 P.2d at 253-54, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 182-83.
240. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
241. See supra notes 87-90 and accompanying text.
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